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Comments
Karl J. Dore*, Q.C. Change of Position and
Estoppel as Defences to an
Action for Money Paid by Mistake
I. Introduction
The recent decision in RBC Dominion Securities Inc.v. Dawson' raises
some interesting questions regarding the defences available to a claim in
restitution for the recovery of money paid by mistake. At issue were the,
defences of change of position and estoppel. Both defences are recognized
in Canadian law, but questions remain regarding their limits and their
relationship.
II. The Dawson Case
The plaintiff, a stockbroker, numbered the two defendants among its
clients, and held for each of them their shares in a certain corporation.
That corporation was reorganized under a mandatory plan which provided
for an exchange of shares with another company on the basis of five
shares for one in the other company. In reporting to its clients, the plaintiff
mistakenly transposed the formula and advised each defendant that the
exchange was on the basis of one share for five in the other company.
Upon receiving this very good news from the plaintiff, each defendant
contacted the plaintiff for confirmation of the information, and each
received confirmation. Thereupon each defendant, honestly and reasonably
relying on that information, instructed the plaintiff to sell their shares.
The end result was that each defendant was grossly overpaid. One
defendant was overpaid by $4,920, receiving $5,070 instead of $150. The
other was overpaid by $3,207, receiving $3,289 instead of $82.
The plaintiff discovered its mistake just two weeks later. But it was
another three weeks before the defendants found out, because the plaintiff
waited sixteen days before doing anything to notify them, and then mailed
letters to them. By that time each defendant had spent most of the money,
and in ways they would not have done had they not had this money. Each
defendant refused to make any refund, and each was then sued. The
actions were consolidated.
* Professor of Law, University of New Brunswick, Fredericton, New Brunswick
1. (1992), 95 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 309; 301 A.P.R. 309 (Nfld. S.C.).
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The defendant who received the $4,920 overpayment was fresh out of
law school at the time with an annual income of $7,500. This payment,
which amounted to two-thirds of her modest income, must have been a
welcome windfall indeed. "When one takes into account [the defendant's]
income, at that time," said Hickman C.J., "it is unlikely that she or anyone
in her financial position would have spent that amount of money, in such
a short time, for items which were not necessities, if she had notsuddenly
and unexpectedly come into the possession of the funds from the sale of
her stock."'2 The judgment by no means gives a full itemization of her
expenditures, but it does specify a chesterfield, VCR and refurbishment
of a dining room table, clothes and other items of furniture.
The other defendant was an articling law student at the time with an
annual income of $9,600. His $3,207 overpayment, which amounted to
one-third of his income, also was a very significant windfall, and he too
promptly disposed of it. He used $1,720 to pay off his Visa account, $500
to pay back a loan from his sisters, and the rest to take an unplanned
holiday and entertain some friends. None of this would have been done
but for the payment.
Hickman C.J. dismissed both actions in toto, finding in favour of the
defendants on two separate grounds, change of position and estoppel.
Il. Change of Position
Change of position is clearly recognized in Canadian law as a defence to
a claim for recovery of money paid by mistake.3 In order to invoke the
defence, the defendant must show that he/she has so changed position as
a result of the mistaken payment that it would be inequitable to be
required to repay it. "The authorities are clear that for a defendant to
succeed he must show a detrimental change of position as a result of the
payment..."' Furthermore, the defendant presumably must not have been
at fault for the mistake,5 and must have acted bona fide and without notice
of the mistake.
The leading case is the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in
Rural Municipality of Storthoaks v. Mobil Oil Canada Ltd.6 The lessee of
a municipality had mistakenly paid $31,000 over a period of almost four
years by continuing to make payments under leases that in fact had been
2.Ibid., at 313.
3. RuralMunicipality ofStorthoaks v. Mobil Oil Canada Ltd. (1975), 1 D.L.R. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.).
4. Hydro Electric Commission of Township ofNepean v. Ontario Hydro (1982), 132 D.L.R.
(3d) 193, at 214 (S.C.C.), (per Dickson J., dissenting).
5. Lamer v. London County Council, (1949] 2 K.B. 683, at 688-9,. (per Denning L.J.).
6. Supra, note 3.
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surrendered. By the time the mistake was discovered the municipality had
spent the $31,000 and had no funds on hand. In order to make any refund
it would have to raise the money by increasing taxes. Nevertheless the
municipality was required to make a full refund. Speaking for the court,
Martland J. said:
... the moneys received from [the payor] were put in the general account
along with tax moneys to pay general everyday expenses. There is no
evidence of any special projects being undertaken or special financial
commitments made because of the receipt of these payments, nor that the
Municipality altered its position in any way because these moneys were
received. The mere fact that the moneys were spent does not, by itself,
furnish an answer to the claim for repayment. If the Municipality is
required to refund the moneys to Mobil it will be in the position of having
had the use of the moneys, over a period of time, without any obligation
to pay interest.
7
Since there was no evidence that thepaymenthad induced the municipality
to do anything different from what it would have done if the payment had
not been made, the defence was bound t6 fail. There was no detriment or
prejudice involved, so there was no reason not to require a refund.
1. Rationale for the Defence
Martland J. accepted Lord Mansfield's view that the action to recover
money paid by mistake is based on equitable grounds, it being prima facie
against conscience for a payee to keep money paid by mistake. No doubt
there is some truth in the argument of counsel in one case that "the
foundation of the right to recover money paid under a mistake of fact is
the principle that a man shall not make a profit out of the mistake of
another."8 Martland J. also accepted Lord Mansfield's views regarding
defences to the action. Lord Mansfield had said in 1760 that the defendant
"may defend himself by every thing which shews that the plaintiff, ex
aequo & bono, is not entitled to the whole of his demand, or to any part
of it." The question, in other words, is "whether the requirement to repay
is just and equitable". 10
Martland J. also made it clear that the payor in these cases does not bear
the burden of proof that it is against conscience, or unjust or inequitable,
for the payee to keep the money. Rather it is for the payee to show that it
is unjust or inequitable to be required to repay.
7.Ibid., at 13.
8. Bayliss v. Bishop of London, [1913] 1 Ch. 127, at 130 (per Lord R. Cecil, K.C. and F.
Phillips).
9. Moses v. Macferlan (1760), 2 Burr. 1005, at 1010; 97 E.R* 676, at 679.
10. Supra, note 3, at 12.
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As Storthoaks makes clear, it is not considered unjust or inequitable to
require the payee to repay simply because the payee has spent the money
before notice of the mistake. In Storthoaks itself the money was used to
pay the municipality's general everyday expenses. If the municipality did
not have this money then presumably it would have raised tax money for
this purpose. There was no evidence that the municipality would be any
worse off by being required to make a refund than it would have been had
it not received the payment in the first place. There was nothing to show
that it would be inequitable to require the municipality to refund the
overpayments.
An example of a very different case would be that of a payee who was
induced by the apparent increase in assets to give that money away to
charity. If the payee were then required to make a refund, the payee would
be very much prejudiced by having done something that he/she would not
have done but for the payment. The payee's position would be worse than
it was before the payment. There seems little reason to make the payee
bear a loss in this situation. It seems better simply to let the loss lie where
it falls in the first place, on the payor. It is one thing to prevent one from
profiting from another's mistake; it is another thing to make one lose
because of another's mistake." As Lord Goff has said: "... where an
innocent defendant's position is so changed that he will suffer an injustice
if called upon to repay or to repay in full, the injustice of requiring him
so to repay outweighs the injustice of denying the plaintiff's restitution.
If the plaintiff pays money to the defendant under a mistake of fact, and
the defendant then, acting in good faith, pays the money or part of it to
charity, it is unjust to require the defendant to make restitution to the
extent that he has so changed his position."
12
In Storthoaks Martland J. noted that there was no evidence of any
special projects undertaken or special financial commitments made
because of the payments. That such evidence could make a difference is,
of course, implicit in this statement. Undertaking special projects would
notby itself be a detriment to the municipality. To the contrary, presumably
this would be a benefit to the municipality. But the point is that the
municipality would be prejudiced if it were then required to refund all the
money. It would be worse off because it would have spent money that it
"did not have" on special projects that it would not have undertaken
without that money. To require a full refund in these circumstances would
be inequitable.
11. See Caroline A. Needham, "Mistaken Payments: A New Look at an Old Theme" (1978),
12 U.B.CL.R. 159, at 191.
12. Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd., [1991] 3 W.L.R. 10 (H.L.), at 34.
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2. Application to Dawson Case
Dawson differs from Storthoaks in the findings of fact that both defendants
did change their positions as a result of the payments. Not only had they
spent the money,3 but they had spent it in extraordinary ways which they
otherwise would not have done.
(i) Chesterfield
There was an exception. One defendant spent $300 on a chesterfield
which she would have done anyway regardless of this payment. It is clear
from Storthoaks that an ordinary expenditure such as this would not be
sufficient to raise the change of position defence. However, the action
against her was dismissed in toto. Although he did not discuss the issue,
presumably Hickman CJ. proceeded on the basis that the change of
position defence operates on an all or nothing basis.
14
There is nothing in principle to support an all or nothing approach to
the change of position defence. Principle supports a pro tanto approach.
The rationale for the defence is that the payee should not suffer detriment
because of the payor's mistake. There is no detriment as regards the $300
chesterfield. Moreover, although Hickman C.J. cites Storthoaks in overall
support of his decision, nothing said in that case supports an all or nothing
approach to the change of position defence. To the contrary, Storthoaks
supports a pro tanto approach. Martland J. quoted Lord Mansfield's
statement that the defendant may show that the plaintiff is not entitled "to
the whole of his demand, or to any part of it."1 5 He also quoted this
statement from the American Restatement of Restitution:6
The right of a person to restitution from another because of a benefit
received is terminated or diminished if, after the receipt of the benefit,
circumstances have so changed that it would be inequitable to require the
other to makefull restitution. 7 (emphasis added)
English law also treats change of position as a pro tanto defence.
18
13. Actually, the judgment did not say that all of the money had been spent before the mistake
was known; it said only that most of it had been spent. Thejudgment did not concern itself with
the unspent portion, presumably for the reason given infra, at note 14 and accompanying text.
14. This would also explain why the judgment did not concern itself with the unspent portion
of the money.
15. Supra, note 3, at 12.
16. American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Restitution; Quasi-Contracts and
Constructive Trusts (St. Paul, American Law Institute Publishers, 1937), ss. 142(1).
17. Supra, note 3, at 13.
18. Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd., supra, note 12.
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It is submitted that the change of position defence should not have
barred a claim for the $300 spent on the chesterfield.' 9
(ii) Debts
One defendant used a substantial part of his overpayment to pay off two
of his debts, a $1,720 Visa account and a $500 loan from two of his sisters.
Now since he would have had to pay these debts anyway at some point,
the overpayment saved him from having to use his other money for this.
Is this then not a case where the money was used to meet ordinary
expenses? It certainly would be if the money had been used to pay debts
as they fell due. Such payments would not qualify for the change of
position defence.
However, Hickman C.J. found that these were not payments to meet
ordinary expenses. He said:
... [The defendant] ... was suddenly and unexpectedly placed in a
financial position which allowed him to make expenditures he would not
have thought of making if he had known that his windfall was illusionary.
[The defendant], who still has debts to pay, testified that had he known the
facts, he would not have paid off his Visa account in one fell sweep, nor
would he have made the other expenditures at that time. I accept [his]
evidence ... and find that his payment of one of his debts only, namely, his
Visa account, was not a payment made in order to meet ordinary expenses.
Rather, [he] took advantage of his windfall to liquidate one or more of his
debts in a manner which he would not ordinarily have done and which was
obviously out of line with the manner in which he was dealing with his total
indebtedness at that time."
It is submitted that this difficulty could have been overcome by giving the
plaintiff subrogation rights allowing it to stand in the shoes of Visa and
the sisters.2' If the plaintiff were substituted for those creditors, on the
same terms as those of the original loans, how would the defendant be
19. Whether the estoppel defence should have acted as a total bar is discussed infra.
20. Supra, note 1, at 314.
21."... '[S]ubrogation' ... is aconvenient way of describing atransfer of rights from one person
to another, without assignment or assent of the person from whom the rights are transferred and
which takes place by operation of law in a whole variety of widely different circumstances.
Some rights by subrogation are contractual in their origin, as in the case of contracts of
insurance. Others, such as the right of an innocent lender to recover from a company moneys
borrowed ultra vires to the extent that these have been expended on discharging the company's
lawful debts, are in no way based on contract and appear to defeat classification except as an
empirical remedy to prevent a particular kind of unjust enrichment": Orakpo v. Manson
Investments Ltd., [1978] A.C. 95, at 104,per Lord Diplock. For a discussion of cases in which
the plaintiff has been subrogated to the rights of a payee's creditors against the payee, see P.
Maddaugh and J. McCamus, The Law of Restitution (Aurora, Canada Law Book, 1990), at
171-181.
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worse off than he was before the payment? The defendant might argue
that he might have received more lenient treatment from his original
creditors than he might from the plaintiff. This would seem to be a weak
argument as regards Visa, but stronger as regards the sisters. However, so
far as we know there was nothing to prevent the sisters from assigning
their rights to someone else. In any event, such possible prejudice would
be negligible compared with the large windfall that will otherwise fall to
the defendant at the plaintiff's expense. To be an excuse, the defendant's
prejudice should be substantial not de minimis. It is submitted that the
defendant would not suffer sufficient prejudice to render it inequitable to
require him to repay these debts to the plaintiff.
It is submitted that the change of position defence should not have
barred a claim regarding the money that the defendant used to pay off his
debts. The plaintiff should have been given subrogation rights for these
debts.
(iii) VCR
One defendant used part of her overpayment to buy a VCR. Here the
original money benefit had been transformed into another benefit. The
original money benefit could not be returned, but the transformed benefit
could have been given. Justice could have been done by granting rights
in the VCR to the plaintiff. After all, in the circumstances why should the
defendant be able to keep this asset free and clear from any claim by the
plaintiff? If the defendant still had the money she would be required to
return it. Her defence was that she had spent the money on the VCR, so
that she would be worse off than before if she were required to repay that
money now. But how would she be prejudiced if the plaintiff were simply
given proprietary rights in the VCR?
Proprietary rights could take the form of either constructive trust or
lien. The former would give full ownership rights in the assets, the latter
a limited charge. The lien is all that is necessary to do justice in a case like
this.
It is submitted that the plaintiff should have been given proprietary
rights by way of a lien against the VCR for the amount spent on it.
(iv) A Caveat
Not every case will be as straightforward as this one in determining the
effect of the mistaken payment. Difficult cases there surely will be. The
question is not what happened to the payment, but what happened
because of the payment. So the answer cannot be found simply by tracing
the money. For example, the payee might put the money in the bank but
then use other money thereby freed up to do something that he/she would
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not do but for the payment. Or the payee might use the money to pay for
ordinary expenses but then use other money thereby freed up to do
something extraordinary. One must take a global view of the situation.
One must also take a broad common sense approach.' A payee might
not be able to prove precisely all the details of his/her change of position,
but a common sense view of the situation may clearly indicate that there
was indeed a sufficient change of position to make it inequitable to
require repayment. In particular, everyone knows that most individuals
are likely over time to adjust their standard of living to their income.Y If
the payee does adjust his/her standard of living because of the overpayment
and spends all the money, it would be inequitable to require repayment
even though the payee cannot identify precisely, on an item by item basis,
what he/she has done differently because of the overpayment. The fact is
that the payment has generally affected the payee's standard of living.24
(v) Vacation, Entertainment and Refurbishment
The vacation, entertainment of friends, and refurbishment of the dining
room table, clothes and other items of furniture, all clearly qualify for the
change of position defence. It would be inequitable to require the
defendants to refund all the money spent on these items. This would
prejudice them.
Moreover, these are not assets like the VCR, which was a straightforward
transformed benefit. Indeed the vacation and entertainment are not assets
at all, both having been consumed. The only assets here are the refurbished
dining room table, clothes and other items of furniture. But the money
used for their refurbishment does not account for all but only part of each
asset, so it is not possible to do justice by granting proprietary rights to the
plaintiff. A lien would render the assets liable to sale for its satisfaction,
and this would not be fair to the defendant because it would leave her
much worse off than before.
22. See Lord Goff and G. Jones, The Law of Restitution, 3rd ed. (London, Sweet & Maxwell,
1986), at 705.
23. "It is of great importance to any man ... that they should not be led to suppose that their
annual income is greater than it really is. Every prudent man accommodates his mode of living
to what he supposes to be his income...": Skyring v. Greenwood (1825), 4 B. & C. 281, at 289;
107 E.R. 1064, at 1067 (per Abbott C.J.).
24. The Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 120, Restitution of Payments Made Under
Mistake of Law (1991), states thatStorthoaks appears to exclude such a defence because it held
that "specific items of expenditure must be proved to have resulted from specific receipts": at
52. However, Martland J. did not say this. He said: "There is no evidence of any special projects
being undertaken or special financial commitments made because of the receipt of these
payments, nor that the Municipality altered its position in any way because these moneys were
received." See text, supra, at note 7.
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Is anything else possible? Would it be fair to require the defendants to
refund part of the money spent on these items? Or does it follow
automatically that if it is inequitable to require a full refund for these items
then it is also inequitable to require a partial refund?
On the one hand we know that the defendants would not have wanted
to spend this money for these items had they known it was not theirs to
spend. So they will be worse off than before if they have to make a full
refund. On the other hand we know that had the money been theirs to
spend then they did want these items. So they will be better off than before
if they do not have to make any refund, because they will end up getting
these items free. Is there anything wrong with this?
There does not seem to be anything wrong with this if they would not
have been willing to spend any of their other money on these items.
Although they would be enriched at the plaintiff's expense, their
enrichment would not be unjust because they would not have wanted
these items had they been asked to give up some of their other money in
return for them. But the case is different if they would have been willing
to spend some of their other money for these items. In that case, in
principle, they should not get these items free but should pay whatever
amounts they would have been willing to pay for them. For example, if
the defendant would have been willing to take the vacation had it been
possible to get it for half price then he should be liable for that half price.
Or if he would have been willing to entertain his friends if he could have
done so at half the price then he should pay this amount to the plaintiff.
If the other defendant would have been willing to refurbish her furniture
or clothing at some other price, then she should pay that price.
The difficulties of determining this in practice, however, are truly
formidable2 How can it be determined whether the defendants would
have been willing to pay some other price? Still more difficult, how can
it be determined what price they would have been willing to pay? This
could be very difficult even for "necessaries," as illustrated by Mutual
Life Ins. Co. of Baltimore v. Metzger,26 where the defendant arranged a
$400 funeral for her mother under the mistaken belief that she was the
beneficiary of a life insurance policy for $500 (the amount incorrectly
stated in the policy), when in fact the policy was for $50. Bond C.J. said:
We are hardly permitted to suppose that she would have contracted a bill
of only $50 if the policy had correctly stated the amount. It is more
reasonable to suppose that she would even then have provided a more
25. See J. Beatson, The Use and Abuse of Unjust Enrichment (Oxford Clarendon, 1991), at
139-141.
26. (1934), 172 A. 610 (Maryland C.A.).
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costly funeral, in expectation of paying for it from her other resources ...
Her testimony is that with all her resources she could not afford to pay $400
for the funeral, and she evidently made some part of the expenditure from
the money expected from this policy over and above the amount of $50.
For exactly what part she relied on this policy it is impossible to determine
from the testimony given. She could not now estimate it except by
conjecture, because when she contracted for the funeral the problem
arising from the reduced amount of insurance was not actually presented
to her and decided.
27
In the end the court concluded that it must make its own estimate of what
she would have spent had the true facts been known, which it fixed at
$200.
Our case presents too many imponderables to suppose that the
defendants would have been willing to pay some other prices for these
items, and to further suppose that we can make a reasonable estimate of
what prices they would have been willing to pay. However, there will be
cases like Mutual Life Ins. Co. of Baltimore v. Metzger where it would
seem reasonable to do this. This may be so even for cases involving
luxuries. For example, suppose a payee, whose habit was to take an
annual vacation, took a special vacation this year, in lieu of the regular
vacation, because of the extra money from the mistaken payment. It
would seem reasonable to suppose that the payee would have been
willing to spend at least as much on the special vacation as he/she would
have spent on a regular vacation. It could be said as well that the
overpayment saved the payee from making an expenditure that he/she
would have made in the ordinary course, and to that extent the change of
position defence should be unavailable.
There is as well the important question of who should bear the burden
of proof regarding the possibility of a partial refund. It is of course for the
payee to prove the change of position defence. The payee must prove that
the payment has caused him/her to act in a way that he/she would not have
otherwise, and that he/she would be prejudiced to be required to pay back
the money now. Beyond that, it is submitted, the burden should rest with
the payor to prove that the payment has caused some other benefit to the
payee and to prove the value of that benefit.
IV. Estoppel
Apart from the change of position defence, the other ground of decision
was that the plaintiff was estopped from recovering any money from the
defendants. Hickman C.J. found that the plaintiff owed duties as a
27.Ibid., at 612. The action was notformoney paid by mistake butforreformation of thepolicy.
However, the change of position defence was considered to be the same for both actions.
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stockbroker to provide accurate information to its clients, that it was
negligent in discharging its duties, and that it induced the defendants to
rely on its advice and information to their detriment.
Estoppel is a very broad doctrine which applies in many different
contexts. In the context of mistaken payment cases, estoppel applies
where the payor has made a representation, expressly by words or
implicitly by conduct, that the payment belongs to the payee, and the
payee, not being at fault for the mistake and acting bona fide and without
notice of the mistake, has relied on the representation in a way that would
be detrimental to him/her if it were untrue.28 There may be as well an
additional requirement that the payor owe a duty to the payee regarding
the representation. 29 This was not an issue in the Dawson case because
both representation and duty were present. A payor who owes a duty to
the payee can be estopped as regards that duty even without arepresentation.
A mere payment of money is not by itself treated as a representation
by the payor that the payment belongs to the payee. Moreover, the courts
have not been quick to impose any duties on a payor regarding mistaken
payments. However, employers are said to owe a duty of accuracy in
paying employees.3 0
According to the traditional view, estoppel operates as a full defence
rather than a pro tanto one." The rationale for this is that estoppel is
simply a rule of evidence whose object is to prevent a representor from
proving facts contrary to his/her representation. In the mistaken payments
context this means that the payor, having represented to the payee that the
money belongs to the payee, is precluded from proving facts contrary to
that representation. Thus estoppel operates on an all or nothing basis.
Compared with the change of position defence, the estoppel defence
is much more difficult to raise, but it does give the payee the advantage
of a full defence. The change of position defence operates on a pro tanto
basis, not on an all or nothing basis. Change of position is a substantive
law defence, not a rule of evidence to preclude arepresentor from proving
facts contrary to his/her representation. In fact change of position does not
depend on representation at all.
In the Dawson case, then, the two defences lead to different results on
the facts. The change of position defence was not a complete defence, but
according to the traditional view the estoppel defence was.
28. Avon County Council v. Howlett, [1983] 1 All E.R. 1073, at 1085 (per Slade L.J.).
29. Ibid., at 1085-1086.
30. P. Maddaugh and J. McCamnus, supra, note 21, at 226-229.
31. Avon County Council v. Howlett, supra, note 28.
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1. Should Estoppel be All or Nothing?
The traditional view of estoppel is ripe for review, not only on its own
merits but also in its relationship to the change of position defence. As
Professor Atiyah has pointed out, it is difficult to understand why
estoppel is treated as a rule of evidence rather than a rule of law. To test
this, he suggests that one should "... ask whether the exclusion of the
evidence is based on grounds-which are in any way related to the general
purpose of the law of evidence, namely. proof of facts by satisfactory
means. The answer is surely No. The evidence is not excluded because of
possible unreliability or any other evidentiary principle. It is excluded
because it would be unjust to admit it and allow the rights of the
representee to be affected by it."'32 The purpose of estoppel is to prevent
detriment. Why should it go beyond this?
The reason given by Slade L.J. in Avon County Council v. Howlett33
was that a pro tanto approach would place an onus on the payee to
precisely quantify the pecuniary amount of his/her prejudice, which
would be unfair. He said:
[O]ne has to postulate a situation in which the defendant was perfectly
entitled to conduct his business affairs on the assumption that the relevant
representations were true, until he was told otherwise. Meantime ... the
defendant... may, in reliance on the representations, have either altered his
general mode of living or undertaken commitments orincurred expenditures
or entered into other transactions which it may be very difficult for him
subsequently to recall and identify retrospectively in complete detail; he
may even have done so, while leaving some of the particular moneys paid
to him by the plaintiff untouched. If the pecuniary amount of his prejudice
has to be precisely quantified by a defendant in such circumstances, he may
be faced with obvious difficulties of proof?4
To be sure, it would not be fair to place such a heavy onus on the payee.
But neither is it necessary to do this. Rather, the courts could take a broad
common sense approach as suggested above for the change of position
defence.35 It is significant that Slade L.J. was alone in making this
suggestion. Moreover, when the House of Lords later recognized change
of position as a pro tanto defence, there was no suggestion that such a
heavy onus would be placed on the payee. One of the reasons given by
Lord Goff for recognizing the change of position defence was that it was
32. P. Atiyah, Essays on Contract (Oxford Clarendon paperback ed., 1986, reprinted with a
new chapter 1990), at 311.
33. Supra, note 28. For a comment, see Andrew S. Burrows, "Mistaken Payments and
Estoppel" (1984), 100, L.Q.R. 31.
34. Ibid., at 1086.
35. See text supra accompanying note 22.
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desirable to have a pro tanto defence, but that it had been held inAvon that
estoppel cannot operate pro tanto.
3 6
All three members of the court in Avon recognized that the traditional
approach to estoppel could cause injustice in some circumstances. And
although they applied the traditional approach to the case before them, in
dicta all three judges indicated that they would at least be prepared to
consider granting relief in some cases. SladeL.J. said that in a case "where
the sums sought to be recovered were so large as to bear no relation to any
detriment which the recipient could possibly have suffered," the court
might have jurisdiction to require the payee to give an undertaking to
return some of the money so as not to make a profit from the estoppel.
37
Eveleigh L.J. would consider a case where it would be "unconscionable"
for the claim to be barred totally. Cumming-Bruce L.J. said that once the
payee proved facts sufficient to raise an estoppel, the onus would be on
the payor to prove that a total bar would be inequitable because it would
allow the payee to retain a windfall profit.
2. Estoppel v. Change of Position
Unlike estoppel, which is a very ancient defence, change of position is a
relatively recent defence. Although the foundations were laid by Lord
Mansfield in the eighteenth century, they were not built upon until this
century. Indeed change of position was not recognized as a defence in
England until 1991.38 It was not even mentioned in the Avon case. When
at last the House of Lords recognized change of position, at the same time
it also made clear that it is a pro tanto defence. The Supreme Court of
Canada, of course, has recognized change of position as a pro tanto
defence since its decision in Storthoaks in 1975.
La Forest J. said recently that "... it will take some time for the courts
to work out the limits of the developing law of restitution ..."39 Among the
matters that need to be worked out, it is submitted, is the relationship
between these two defences. In particular, should estoppel continue to be
a full defence when change of position is available as a pro tanto defence?
The answer, it is submitted, is No. First, for the same reasons that the
courts will not allow a payee to use the change of position defence to make
a profit from the payor's mistake, they should not allow the payee to use
36. Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd., supra, note 12, at 33-4.
37. Supra, note 28, at 1089. An undertaking appears curious, but at least it would preserve the
form of the rule of evidence approach, though not of course its substance.
38. Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd., supra, note 12.
39. Air Canada v. British Columbia (1989), 59 D.L.R. (4th) 161 (S.C.C.), at 193.
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estoppel for this purpose. Second, in cases of money paid by mistake,
there is now great overlap between the two defences. Indeed change of
position will apply to almost every case to which estoppel will. Estoppel
is a very blunt tool for the prevention of detriment. It does very rough
justice. It prevents detriment, but sometimes at the expense of justice for
both parties. Change of position, in contrast, is a much more refined tool.
It prevents detriment and does justice for both parties. Change of position
is thus a much better tool for the job. Since it makes no sense to use a blunt
tool when a better tool is at hand, it is submitted that estoppel should not
be used when the change of position defence is available.4"
V. Conclusion
Hickman C.J. began his discussion of the law on mistaken payments by
saying that it was somewhat fluid and unsettled, that there were overlapping
issues, and that an holistic approach should be taken. Indeed he said that
the English decisions reminded him of "Shakespeare's mischievous
comment, when referring to those charged with the interpretation of the
law, in As You Like It, he said, 'and then, the justice ... Full of wise saws
and modem instances'." 41 Having thus set the stage, that he did not then
write a better part for himself is a pity.
40.... "[i]t was held ... in Avon County Council v. Howlett that estoppel cannot operate pro
tanto, with the effect that if, for example, the defendant has innocently changed his position by
disposing of part of the money, a defence of estoppel would provide him with a defence to the
whole of the claim. Considerations such as these provide a strong indication that, inmany cases,
estoppel is not an appropriate concept to deal with the problem": Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale
Ltd., supra, note 12, at 34 (per Lord Goff).
41. Supra, note 1, at 315.
